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Agglomerama
Lee Anne Fennell*
The world’s population is rapidly becoming urbanized and in a
matter of decades will be overwhelmingly so. 1 Already, over eighty
percent of the U.S. population dwells in urban areas. 2 The forces that
explain these trends, which can be placed under the general rubric of
agglomeration economies, 3 present a newly pressing challenge for
students of commons dilemmas. How can urban space, and the
property rights that structure it, be organized in ways that will foster
and capture the positive externalities produced by proximity among
people and land uses while controlling the negative spillovers
produced by that same proximity?
The problem is a tricky one. Because the raw ingredients of
collaboration and interaction—people, businesses, products, services,

* Max Pam Professor of Law and Ronald H. Coase Research Scholar, University of Chicago
Law School. I thank Marcilynn Burke, Daria Roithmayr, Carol Rose, David Schleicher, Lior
Strahilevitz, Barton Thompson, Jr., and the participants in the 2014 BYU Law Review
Symposium on the Global Commons for helpful comments and questions. I am also grateful
for financial support from the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan and Harold J. Green Faculty Funds
and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.
1. See U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC . AFFAIRS, P OPULATION DIV., WORLD
URBANIZATION P ROSPECTS, THE 2014 REVISION, HIGHLIGHTS, at 1, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/SER.A/352
(2014),
available
at
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf (reporting that “54 per
cent of the world’s population resid[ed] in urban areas in 2014” and that “by 2050, 66 per
cent of the world’s population is projected to be urban”); Michael Batty, Commentary, When
All the World’s a City, 43 ENV’T & P LAN. A 765, 767–78 (2011) (predicting that if current
trends continue, “the entire world will be urbanised by 2092”).
2. Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar.
26, 2012), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb1250.html (reporting, based on data from the 2010 Census, that “[u]rban areas—defined as
densely developed residential, commercial and other nonresidential areas—now account for
80.7% of the U.S. population, up from 79.0% in 2000”). In 1790, the figure was 5.1%,
although there have been some intervening changes in the Census Bureau’s definition of
“urban.” See Population: 1790 to 1990: United States, Urban and Rural, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU , http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (last visited Sept. 9,
2014); see also History: Urban and Rural Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU ,
http://www.census.gov/history/www/programs/geography/urban_and_rural_areas.html
(last visited Sept. 9, 2014) (detailing definitional changes).
3. See infra Part I.A.1.
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venues—take up space and time, congestion vies with agglomeration
benefits within cities. 4 It is not simply a case of “the more the
merrier”; 5 each additional participant can add value only by burning
up scarce inputs, including space. Brilliant thoughts that might be
added together without apparent limit suddenly run into hard
constraints when they must be delivered in human form, given all
that is necessary to house and propel and sustain human beings as
they interact. Likewise, the complementarities offered by
agglomerations of shops, entertainment establishments, and
restaurants are limited by the physical space that each consumes—
space that can be managed and shrunk with clever layout and
transportation solutions, 6 but that nonetheless pushes back hard
against the advantages of adding more energy and variety to a
district. 7 Meanwhile, heterogeneous households and businesses
asymmetrically generate and absorb the negative and positive
externalities that are interwoven through urban life. 8
Urban interaction space can be conceptualized as a type of
commons. 9 It presents the threat of overcrowding or overharvesting,

4. The negative aspects of agglomeration are sometimes referred to in the literature as
“agglomeration diseconomies,” although I will primarily use the word “congestion” very
broadly to refer to these negative effects. See infra Part I.A.2; see also David Schleicher, The
City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1528–29 (2010) (noting the
“catch-all” way in which the term “congestion” is used and suggesting the term
“negative agglomerations”).
5. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI . L. REV. 711, 768 (1986) (explaining that increasing
returns to scale can produce what amounts to “the reverse of the ‘tragedy of the commons’: it
is a ‘comedy of the commons,’ as is so felicitously expressed in the phrase, ‘the more
the merrier’”).
6. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive
Externalities, 54 WM . & M ARY L. REV. 211, 251–52 (2012) (discussing “vertical malls” like
Water Tower Place in Chicago).
7. I will use the term “energy” throughout the piece in a nontechnical way to refer to
the vibrancy or vitality of an area, which produces its agglomeration benefits. Earlier work has
used similar terms to get at this idea. See, e.g., Casey Dougal et al., Urban Vibrancy and
Corporate Growth, 70 J. Fin. 163, 165 (2015) (using the term “vibrancy” to capture “the
endogenous interactions of the people living in the city . . . that influence knowledge diffusion
between a city’s workers, technology spillovers between neighboring firms, or consumption
externalities between city’s residents”).
8. See infra Part II (discussing heterogeneity).
9. That urban areas embody and embed common-pool resources is well recognized.
For example, some recent work has focused on how to manage access to congestible or
degradable resources such as urban public parks or shared spatial elements. See, e.g., Sheila R.
Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (2011);
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but it also poses the risk of undercultivation if it fails to attract parties
who are well suited to generate agglomeration benefits. 10 The
method for rationing access to prime urban space should, therefore,
select not only for the value that users place on locating in particular
spots, but also for those users’ agglomeration-friendly and
congestion-mitigating traits. What is being rationed is not just access
to the consumption opportunities that particular urban districts
offer, but also access to a (rivalrous) production platform for
generating the very agglomeration economies that make those
consumption opportunities so valuable. The challenge is to assemble
participants together whose joint consumption and production
activities will maximize social value.
Cities thus embed a particularly interesting type of collective
action problem, which I will refer to here as a “participant assembly
problem.” Economists have studied many similarly structured
problems. Some notable examples include concert and event ticket
pricing that is designed to attract enthusiastic audiences, 11 shopping
mall leasing practices that account for asymmetric spillovers between
anchor and smaller stores, 12 local government services like schooling
and safety for which residents represent an important input, 13 and
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Managing the Urban Commons, 160 U. P A. L. REV. 1995 (2012); see
also Benjamin Davy, Polyrational Property: Rules for the Many Uses of Land, 8 INT’L J.
COMMONS 472, 475 (2014) (addressing the “spatial commons,” defined as “the shared land
uses typical of cities and other human settlements”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to
the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 68–69 (1994) (discussing the “neighborhood
commons”). Other scholars have turned a spotlight on infrastructure elements like roads and
mass transit that are interlaced through private holdings but that themselves elude private
ownership. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open
Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI . L. REV. 1499 (2013) (reviewing BRETT
FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)). My
discussion focuses primarily on distortions in location choices, a topic distinct from these other
inquiries, but one which carries implications for them (and vice versa).
10. See Rose, supra note 5, at 769 (noting that in contexts like festivals, “participants
need encouragement to join these activities, where their participation produces beneficial
‘externalities’ for other participants”).
11. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
12. These leasing practices have been expressly invoked as a potential model for
addressing urban spillovers. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6; B. Peter Pashigian
& Eric D. Gould, Internalizing Externalities: The Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 115, 140–41 (1998).
13. See, e.g., Robert M. Schwab & Wallace E. Oates, Community Composition and the
Provision of Local Public Goods: A Normative Analysis, 44 J. P UB. ECON. 217 (1991); Wallace
E. Oates, The Use of Local Zoning Ordinances to Regulate Population Flows and the Quality of
Local Services, in ESSAYS IN LABOR M ARKET ANALYSIS 201 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Wallace E.

1375

DO NOT DE LETE

9/25/2015 1:47 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW R EVIEW

2014

differential pricing in higher education to assemble a desired mix of
students. 14 In these cases and more, the characteristics of users or
customers are inputs into the quality of a good, 15 complicating the
problem of rationing access through ordinary market (or marketmimicking) measures. Despite some worthy recent attempts to
grapple with the issue of optimizing agglomeration spillovers in
cities, 16 the legal literature lacks a solid account of the participant
assembly problems that emerge within urban areas and how they
might be resolved. In this essay, I make a start at exploring
that issue. 17
The analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part I specifies the nature of
the commons problem that agglomeration and its evil twin,
congestion, together present within urban areas. Part II focuses on
the significance of heterogeneity among economic actors and recasts
the challenge as one of participant assembly. Part III surveys a set of
strategies that have been pursued or might be pursued to grapple
with these problems. The emerging significance of urban
agglomeration requires the law to think flexibly and creatively about
the problem of co-location in its assignment and refinement of
property rights.
I. URBAN INTERACTION SPACE AS A COMMONS
A city is not a single common-pool resource, but rather
comprises multiple overlapping resources that interact with private
holdings and that residents, visitors, firms, commuters, tourists, and
others access, exploit, produce, and regenerate in varying
Oates eds., 1977).
14. See, e.g., Michael Rothschild & Lawrence J. White, The Analytics of the Pricing of
Higher Education and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs, 103 J. P OL. ECON.
573 (1995).
15. See, e.g., id.
16. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 G EO .
M ASON L. REV. 637 (2012).
17. Agglomeration benefits come in many forms and exist at a variety of scales, from
block-level to regional. See, e.g., id. at 638; Pierre-Phillippe Combes & Laurent Gobillon, The
Empirics of Agglomeration Economies, in 5 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN
ECONOMICS 247, 294–95 (Gilles Duranton et al. eds., 2015); see also infra Part I.A.1. I focus
primarily here on relatively small-scale urban settings—prime urban districts—where space is
constrained even if the metropolitan area or the city itself can expand outward. Accordingly,
my analysis does not address factors that bear on the overall growth paths of cities, such as
mountains or bodies of water that present natural barriers to expansion, although these
features can influence the prevalence of good substitutes for a given urban district.
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combinations. This Part focuses on one set of decisions that
profoundly influences the dynamics of these multiple commons: the
location choices of firms and households. 18 When economic actors—
firms and households—occupy private property in urban areas, the
locations they choose serve as platforms for accessing (and
controlling access to) a composite urban resource that I will term
“interaction space.” The amount of value that urban interaction
space can generate depends on who can access it, both as consumers
of the space and as contributors to its quality—whether for good or
ill. Location choices determine access to interaction space but, due
to externalized costs and benefits, do not fully price in the effects of
that access.
Section A examines the externalized costs and benefits that flow
from locating within urban areas—both positive agglomeration
benefits and negative congestion costs. Section B explores the
dilemmas these externalities can produce.
A. Agglomeration and Congestion
The densities and interdependencies that characterize urban life
yield both positive and negative externalities. The former are often
associated with the benefits of agglomeration (agglomeration
economies), while the latter are typically associated with the idea of
congestion (agglomeration diseconomies). The tradeoffs between
these two types of impacts have been the subject of economic
treatments of city formation and growth. 19 Here, I focus on how
these two types of externalities might distort the location choices of
firms and households.

18. By location choices, I mean decisions to possess and occupy real property in a fixed
location on an ongoing (more than short-term) basis, typically through ownership of a
leasehold or fee interest. Shorter-term occupancy of spaces by hotel guests, homeless people,
hospital patients, and so on also represent interesting location choices that bear on the overall
urban fabric, but these will be addressed here only indirectly through the decisions made by
the owners and operators of the properties that they inhabit.
19. See, e.g., Luís M.A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in Cities, 340 SCIENCE,
June 21, 2013, at 1438; Jeffrey C. Brinkman, Congestion, Agglomeration, and the
Structure of Cities (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 13-25, 2013),
available
at
http://philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/workingpapers/2013/wp13-25.pdf.

1377

DO NOT DE LETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW R EVIEW

9/25/2015 1:47 PM

2014

1. Agglomeration
The benefits of agglomeration—the clustering together of firms
and households—have long been recognized, 20 but legal scholarship
has recently begun to engage agglomeration economics in a more
direct and sustained way. 21 Various enumerations of the benefits
flowing from clustering have appeared in the literature, many of
which use the work of Alfred Marshall as a starting point 22 and
emphasize such factors as knowledge spillovers among firms, labormarket matching, and supply linkages. 23 One influential taxonomy
uses the broad categories of “sharing, matching, and learning
mechanisms.” 24 Parties in close proximity with each other are able to
share indivisible resources (as well as risk) and mutually benefit from
shared access to urban variety and diversity. 25 Proximity also enables
actors to match up with each other in labor and other markets 26 and
20. The legal literature has sometimes referred to these benefits by other names or in
somewhat different ways than has the economics literature. For example, Carol Rose examined
the benefits of certain forms of widespread collective participation (such as in markets and
dances) through the lens of the commons. Rose, supra note 5. Her focus on increasing returns
to scale and the positive externalities of participation is very much in line with the notion of
agglomeration benefits, though she does not use that term. See id. at 766–71; see also
Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1510 & n.14 (discussing legal literature addressing agglomeration
and related ideas); Benkler, supra note 9, at 1511–18 (discussing Rose’s contributions and
their connections to later work on the public domain and infrastructure commons).
21. See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1510 & n.14; see generally id.; Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 6; Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16.
22. ALFRED M ARSHALL, P RINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS IV.X.7–13 §3 (8th ed. 1920),
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Marshall/marP.html.
23. See Gilles Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration
Economies, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2063, 2066 (2004); see
also J. Vernon Henderson, Urban Scale Economies, in HANDBOOK OF URBAN STUDIES 243,
243–48 (Ronan Paddison ed., 2001) (identifying Marshall’s work with the categories of
“[i]nformation spillovers,” “[l]abour market externalities,” and “[u]rban diversity and Adam
Smith specialization”); Schleicher, supra note 4, at 1516 (identifying Marshall’s work with
“three effects”: “reduced transportation costs for goods,” “insurance and specialization gains
from large labor and consumption markets,” and “information spillovers”).
24. Duranton & Puga, supra note 23, at 2066 (emphasis omitted); see Combes &
Gobillon, supra note 17, at 249 (citing Duranton and Puga’s schema as “the currently most
used typology”).
25. See Duranton & Puga, supra note 23, at 2067–86 (analyzing sharing mechanisms).
26. See id. at 2086–98 (analyzing matching mechanisms). Although studies of
agglomeration economies often focus on labor market matching, urban areas also facilitate the
matching of people into relationships, social organizations, and so on. See, e.g., Schleicher,
supra note 4, at 1521–23. The specialization and diversity in an urban area, including its
shopping and entertainment districts, also match customers more quickly and precisely with
the goods and services they prefer. See id. at 1522.
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learn from each other. 27 Perhaps the most intuitive agglomeration
benefit is the reduction in transportation costs produced by
proximity. Indeed, Edward Glaeser boils down the benefits of
agglomeration to the single idea of reducing transportation costs—
for “goods, people and ideas.” 28
The most economically significant manifestations of these
benefits can shift over time as technology changes. 29 But whether the
advantages take the form of deep labor markets, long-tailed retail
diversification, convenient shopping districts, exciting nightlife,
opportunities for relationship matching, or specialized knowledge
basins, real economic value is produced by the co-location of people
and firms within urban areas. The magnitude and nature of these
gains will be sensitive to the relative spatial placement of households,
firms, and various land uses within the urban envelope. Not all
landowners are capable of producing the level of agglomeration
benefits that is optimal for a given location. Hence, it is not only
necessary for landowners to “do the right thing” in a given space,
but also for them to “occupy the right spaces”—and stay away from
spaces where their contributions will be suboptimal. 30

27. See Duranton & Puga, supra note 23, at 2098–109 (analyzing
learning mechanisms).
28. EDWARD L. G LAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION, AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM
6–8, 117 (2008).
29. For example, some scholars have suggested that cities have become less important as
sites of production as the spatial constraints on production have loosened and that their
importance now turns on their role as sites of consumption. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Jed
Kolko & Albert Saiz, Consumers and Cities, in THE CITY AS AN ENTERTAINMENT M ACHINE
135 (Terry Nichols Clark ed., 2011). On this account, the ability for cities to conveniently
provide a wide array of niche goods and (especially) nonportable services and experiences
becomes relatively more important than the ability of the city to economize on trips to and
from the workplace. See id. at 136 (observing that “restaurants, theaters, and an attractive mix
of social partners are hard to transport and are therefore local goods”); see also M ARSHALL,
supra note 22, at IV.X.14 § 4 (observing that reductions in transportation costs enable firms to
buy distant goods but also “tend[] to bring skilled artisans to ply their crafts near to the
consumers who will purchase their wares”); Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 242
(focusing on the transportation cost savings that become available when shoppers are able to
bundle their shopping trips for multiple items).
30. It is well recognized that land use conflicts are sometimes best solved by one party—
and not necessarily the one engaging in the more intensive use—staying away. See, e.g., Ind.
Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1181 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)
(“Brutal though it may seem to say it, the inappropriate use to which land is being put in the
Blue Island yard and neighborhood may be, not the transportation of hazardous chemicals, but
residential living. The analogy is to building your home between the runways at O’Hare.”). It
can also be inefficient for parties to co-locate even when their land uses are perfectly
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2. Congestion
Congestion is the flip side of agglomeration. Its existence
illuminates the type of good that agglomeration benefits really are.
As a first cut, we might say that congestion keeps agglomeration
from being a pure public good—a resource that is both
nonexcludable and nonrival. 31 Rather, congestion makes
agglomeration benefits rivalrous or “subtractable,” even as exclusion
from those benefits remains difficult—in other words, a commonpool resource. 32 Like Hardin’s prototypical pasture, urban space is
“open to all” and subject to overgrazing. 33 But that is not the full
story. Agglomeration benefits are not depleted by individuals literally
consuming or degrading them in the manner of a cow eating and
trampling grass. Rather, the depletion occurs in two other ways.
The first involves people jostling for a good position in the urban
interaction space. To receive agglomeration benefits, one must
occupy a location that affords access to them. This interaction space
is degraded when too many people try to occupy it at once, even if
the agglomeration benefits themselves are unaffected. 34 Think of a
free open-air concert. If too many people crowd near the stage, the
listening and viewing zone may become unpleasantly crowded. The
music itself is unaffected, but getting into a position to consume this
nonrival good requires occupying physical space, which is rival.
Agglomeration benefits, then, might be viewed as nonrival goods
that are strictly complementary to the rival common-pool resource of
well-positioned space.
Second, congestion elicits responses that can impede the
production of agglomeration benefits. Before purely physical or
engineering capacity constraints are reached, the negative effects of

compatible, if the co-location forecloses a different co-location that would yield
greater benefits.
31. See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES,
P UBLIC G OODS, AND CLUB G OODS 6–7 (1986).
32. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM , UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 23–24
& fig.1.3 (2005).
33. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
34. In the urban context, an interaction space represents a congestible resourceappropriation environment within which nonrival agglomeration benefits can be enjoyed. Cf.
Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 922–24 (2004)
(noting that although a “fixed-pot” resource is not diminished by commoners competing over
it, there can still be losses in the linked “resource-appropriation environment”).
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congestion will typically prompt collective action that rations access
to the interaction space, turning it into at least a partially excludable
resource. 35 But unless the method of rationing access is well
calibrated to allow in the right number and type of participants,
agglomeration economies may suffer. For example, a predominance
of large-lot zoning can limit the number of people who can enter a
municipality for purposes of consuming its goods and services, but it
also limits the number of people who will be on hand to add to the
life of the community.
Heterogeneity among potential participants creates additional
difficulties. When space is tightly limited, every inclusion implies an
exclusion—one that will impact both the consumption and
production sides of the urban agglomeration equation. Ideally, prime
urban space for generating agglomeration benefits would be
matched to its most valuable use, taking into account the congestion
impacts inflicted and suffered by that use. The fact that not all of the
effects of locational choices are internalized to the chooser, however,
presents an interesting collective action problem.
B. Locating Dilemmas
To understand the nature of the dilemma produced by location
decisions, we can start by examining where and how private payoffs
and social payoffs diverge.
1. Mixed ownership and incentive misalignments
Tragedies of the commons come in two basic flavors: overuse
(e.g., overgrazing a pasture) and underinvestment (e.g., shirking on
a communal farm). 36 Both problems arise from a misalignment
between privately owned elements (cows and labor) and commonly

35. If the excludability is complete enough, the agglomeration benefits may resemble a
club good. For description and analysis of club goods, see James M. Buchanan, An Economic
Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 125 (1965). See also OSTROM , supra note 32, at 23–24
fig.1.3 (using the term “toll goods” for resources combining relatively easy exclusion with
low subtractability).
36. Nothing turns on this distinction, however, and it is often possible to characterize a
given situation in both ways. See Fennell, supra note 34, at 917 (observing that a dirty carpet
in the common room of a house could be characterized either as stemming from overuse of
the carpet while wearing muddy shoes or underinvestment in shoe-cleaning or carpetcleaning efforts).
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owned elements (pastures and crops). 37 People make decisions that
simultaneously affect both the commonly owned and individually
owned elements, but because they experience all of the payoffs
associated with the private holdings and only a fraction of the payoffs
of the common holdings, these decisions may be skewed. The
resulting incentive misalignment can be readily modeled as a twoperson Prisoner’s Dilemma in which each party has an incentive to
defect (add too many cattle, for example), regardless of what the
other person does. 38 This tragic result is far from inevitable for a
number of reasons that have been well rehearsed in the literature. 39
Nonetheless, the standard fable provides a conceptual starting point
for thinking about how private and social payoffs pull apart.
The city analog to placing an additional cow on the commons is
the decision to locate one’s firm or household, along with the
privately owned structure that contains it, in a particular position
within an urban area. 40 Such structures and their operations, like
grazing cattle, draw sustenance from, and visit impacts upon, the
surrounding community. Does the city then become “overgrazed”?
Not necessarily. As Carol Rose explained in The Comedy of the
Commons, there are aspects of city life—marketplaces,
communication, celebration—that gain energy and value from an
abundance of participants. 41 Instead of resembling cattle that only
degrade the commons with their trampling and grazing, economic
actors who locate themselves within a city operate more like an
especially talented variety of cattle who, by virtue of their proximity

37. See, e.g., id. at 916; Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right
Paradigm, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 16, 22–23 (1973) (noting problematic potential of “incongruity
between ownership opportunities”); Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons,
Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF P ROPERTY LAW 35, 37–38
& n.16 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (discussing tragedy as a function of an
abutment between private and common ownership elements and citing related literature).
38. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM , G OVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 3–5 (1990).
39. See id. at 58–102 (describing self-governed common-pool resources that have
endured for long periods of time); see also Fennell, supra note 37, at 35–36
(discussing literature).
40. It might seem that one is not making any decision at all about the placement of the
structure one occupies if one moves into an existing building. However, by occupying the
structure for one’s intended purpose, it is as if one is effectively continuing to locate the
structure there over time insofar as one’s own occupancy stands as an impediment to the
repurposing, demolition, or reconfiguration of the structure in question.
41. Rose, supra note 5; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing agglomeration benefits).
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to each other, can cause manna to rain down from heaven for
everyone—even as they also trample and graze.
Thus, some of the returns from urban locational decisions are
privately captured by the locating actors and some are diffused
through the community through parallels to manna (agglomeration
benefits) and trampling (congestion costs). 42 The relationship among
these payoff streams bears on firm and household decisions about
where to locate—and determines whether and how those decisions
will be distorted.
2. Privately captured returns: Of buckets and spoons
First, consider a firm’s or household’s privately captured returns.
These returns can stem either from the owner’s activities on her
property or from her choice of location, which exposes her to
negative and positive spillovers from outside her property. I have
previously characterized property as a “leaky bucket of gambles” that
aims, albeit imperfectly, to collect inputs made by the owner and
deliver back to her the associated outcomes. 43 In an agrarian context,
the relationship is captured by the idea of reaping what one sows,
where enforceable property boundaries do a reasonable job of
containing both inputs and outcomes. As we move to metropolitan
settings, however, an increasingly large proportion of the value
associated with property has nothing to do with what the owner is
doing on or with the property; rather, it depends on where the
property is located relative to other users and uses (as mediated by
land use controls and augmented by governmental provision of
infrastructure and public goods). Thus, the outcomes of the gambles
any given owner takes with respect to her property are increasingly in
the hands of other parties. 44
Private property continues to serve as a locus for making and
collecting on investments that are made on-site, but many of the

42. Although I use the term “congestion costs” as shorthand, not all costs associated
with locational choices take the form of physical crowdedness. Pockets of low-density space
that must be traversed in order for parties to interact and secure agglomeration benefits also
serve to “congest” the relevant urban landscape, even though they may make the area feel
less rather than more crowded.
43. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 Y ALE L.J. 1400, 1405, 1442–
43 (2007).
44. By the same token, her activities as an owner are likely to have increasingly
significant cross-boundary impacts on those around her, for better or worse.
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privately captured payoffs it generates stem from its location rather
than from behavior on the part of the owner. Real property, by
virtue of the spatial position it occupies relative to other uses and
users, serves as a kind of spoon for collecting the positive benefits of
agglomeration. The value of what is scooped up depends not just on
who is co-located nearby, but also on how the owner’s uses interact
with those co-located uses. However, just as only so many spoons
can be inserted into a communal bowl of ice cream before the
dessert-eating experience starts to degrade, 45 the agglomerationscooping capacity of property is rival and subject to congestion. Each
economic actor that locates in a given interaction space depletes the
physical area available to others who might similarly wish to enjoy
agglomeration benefits.
Of course, as the reference to congestion suggests, part of what
the property scoops up comprises negative rather than positive effects
of proximity to other uses and users. Where these negative elements
dominate, the property’s location may be more like a sponge that
passively picks up externalities than a spoon that actively seeks to
capture them. Every economic actor would prefer that others absorb
the negative impacts of neighboring uses but wishes to be located in
such a manner as to benefit from the positive impacts.
3. Dispersed impacts: Sloshes and sparks
Consider next the impacts that are not captured by a given owner,
but that are instead diffused to others in the area, becoming part of
the locational payoffs that nearby others enjoy (or suffer). Some of
these dispersed impacts are literal spillovers from specific behaviors
that owners engage in on their properties. A factory that makes
widgets or chocolate will have impacts, negative or positive, on
multiple neighbors by virtue of dust or odors put into the air that flow
over the property lines. These are “sloshes” (even if microscopic or
aesthetic) from the owner’s bucket of gambles. Spillovers of this
nature are discouraged by the law; one can be made to pay for harms
affecting one’s neighbors, but one cannot generally collect payment
for benefits conferred on them. 46 This asymmetry exists for good

45. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (using an ice cream cone as an example of an
individual resource, whereas “a milkshake might allow two consumers, if they are friendly”).
46. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested
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reason: it creates incentives for economic actors to keep the impacts of
their operations within their own boundaries and to avoid substituting
forced transactions for consensual ones. 47
Other impacts flow cumulatively or synergistically from the
combined interactions of businesses, enterprises, and households.
For example, each proximate commercial shop contributes to a
“shopping district” and each art gallery contributes to the “gallery
district” simply by virtue of its existence and possession of certain
functional and qualitative attributes. Similarly, a “tech corridor” or
“eclectic neighborhood” depends in significant part on the
cumulative characteristics of the enterprises and residents,
respectively. Impacts in this category are not unintended sloshes
from a discrete on-site enterprise but rather are “sparks” that can
come together to produce local public goods (or bads), depending
on who and what else is in the vicinity. If there is nothing nearby to
“catch fire,” the impact is never experienced. 48 Where the effects are
positive, there is a social interest in promoting the mix of conditions
and participants that foster them.
As with actual sparks that can contribute to destructive fires or
productive combustion, mixing activity within an interaction space
can produce negative as well as positive synergies. Under the general
rubric of congestion we can place a variety of negatives, from crime
and juvenile delinquency, to low-level increases in incivility and
jostling, to issues like pollution and traffic snarls. While some of
these effects may be easy to connect to particular land uses (and
Benefits, 108 M ICH. L. REV. 189, 195–98 (2009); Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and
Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1157–59 (2006); Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA.
L. REV. 65 (1985). Where one cannot collect for positive externalities conferred on others, one
has less incentive to engage in the activity that generates those spillovers. This does not mean,
however, that parties will always refrain from activities that generate positive benefits for others;
they would be expected to engage in them if their internalized returns are high enough to justify
the activity. In such cases, the positive externalities are Pareto-irrelevant ones. See infra text
accompanying notes 54–58.
47. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 43, at 1450–52; Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative
Liability, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 25 (2009) (“[A]llowing a party to collect for benefits
voluntarily conferred would encourage, rather than discourage, the voluntarily bypassing of the
market.”). For other potential explanations of the limits on restitution, including the law’s
attempt to identify the “better bargainer,” see Levmore, supra note 46, at 68–81.
48. This is of course true of traditional nuisance-like spillovers as well, as Coase famously
observed in pointing out the reciprocal nature of land use incompatibilities. See R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). The insight is captured well in the
maxim “it takes two to tort.” See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort
and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771, 822 (1982).
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therefore are more slosh-like), many arise through cumulative and
often nonlinear effects among many uses in an urban area.
The interactions between internalized and externalized payoffs
create potential distortions in behavior, including the initial decision
about where to locate. Every household or firm will wish to position
itself to maximize the net positive inputs into its own private income
and consumption stream that it can derive from the commonly
owned elements that surround it. 49 At the same time, each
household or firm will be largely indifferent to the magnitude or sign
of its own contributions to the collective. The next section considers
whether and how these incentive misalignments are likely to matter.
C. Plentitude and Irrelevance
In the city, the tragedy of the commons and the comedy of the
commons come together—at least potentially. Locating in the city
may mean imposing costs on others, but staying out of the city may
deprive others of the benefits of interaction. Which story will be the
dominant one depends on what is plentiful and what is in short
supply. If interaction space is plentiful, the need for interacting parties
(and the associated “energy” or vibrancy) becomes the focus. If
interacting parties are plentiful relative to the available interaction
space, however, then congestion becomes salient and the situation
takes on the cast of an overgrazing tragedy. The two scenarios both
carry the potential for tragedy: one through underprovision of an
energy-producing input (human capital) and the other through
overgrazing of another input essential to the production of a city’s
energy (space). Because both inputs are necessary to the alchemy that
takes place within a city, the undersupply of one and the overdrawing
of the other are both problematic.
These two problems could conceivably appear together (an
uncomfortably crowded city that is nonetheless bereft of any useful
activity). But often the pressure of one of these problems causes the
other to fade out of view, at least temporarily. Consider a shrinking
city that is losing population and investment. Underprovision of the
kind of dynamic agglomerations that spark growth is the pressing

49. For a helpful recent discussion of the ubiquity of commonly owned elements
interwoven through private property arrangements, see generally Benkler, supra note 9. In
addition to infrastructure, however, the agglomeration economies that are produced and the
overall atmosphere that produces it are part of the urban commons.
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problem. Interaction space, while strictly necessary to carry out any
plan of revitalization, may not be in any immediate danger of being
overgrazed. It is, for the moment at least, a plenteous good. 50 The
fact that space may be consumed by economic actors without regard
for the effects on others is of no consequence because it is not
currently scarce. But, importantly, its plentitude is an artifact of the
tragedy of underprovision that is taking center stage. Conversely,
once congestion becomes a concern, the overuse of space (and
related resources) may become the focal point, while the need to
induce optimal human capital contributions takes a back seat.
Overcorrections may undo not just the congestion but the
underlying (positive) cause of it. 51
At other times, both inputs—space and human capital—may be
sufficiently plenteous in supply as to present a “comic” scenario in
which the commons is less a site of strife than a platform that enables
actors to freely enjoy and produce reciprocal spillovers that generate
increasing returns to scale—“the more the merrier.” 52 Even within
the comic narrative, there may be some need to encourage
participation. 53 However, positive externalities of the sort historically
generated through participation in markets, festivals, and other
interactive arenas may have required little encouragement. Each
actor reciprocally gleaned roughly as much from others as she
contributed to others through her participation—and, importantly,
was typically contributing and gleaning through the very same
discrete action in the commons, so that gleaning could not be
unbundled from contributing.
These points connect tightly to an important distinction between
Pareto-relevant and Pareto-irrelevant externalities, which James
Buchanan and Craig Stubblebine explored in a groundbreaking (but
still insufficiently appreciated) article. 54 An externality that is
irrelevant to Pareto-efficiency is one whose continued existence (that
50. See Rose, supra note 5, at 717–18 (discussing plenteous goods).
51. The result may resemble a Yogi Berra quip: “No one goes there anymore; it’s too
crowded.” For an analysis of Berra’s comment in the context of overcrowded taverns, see
Matthew Yglesias, The Economics of Nobody Goes There Anymore, It’s Too Crowded, SLATE (Aug.
8,
2012) http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/08/08/the_economics_of_
nobody_goes_there_anymore_it_s_too_crowded.html.
52. Rose, supra note 5, at 768.
53. Id. at 769.
54. James M. Buchanan & W. Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA,
371 (1962).
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is, the fact that the costs or benefits in question have not been
internalized to the actor who produces it) does not alter the behavior
of the actor. A factory that pollutes heedless of its neighbors, but
that would go on polluting at the same level even if it were forced to
pay for the harm to its neighbors, is producing an irrelevant negative
externality. Likewise, a gardener who makes her garden as beautiful
for her own pleasure as she would make it if her neighbors were
forced to pay for all the spillover benefits they receive is producing
an irrelevant positive externality.
Urban externalities are often irrelevant to efficiency; the actor
would behave no differently if she were to internalize those effects.
In the case of a negative externality like crowding, perhaps she would
still glean enough from being present in a given location to make it
worth her while even if she had to pay full freight for the costs her
presence imposes on others. In the case of a positive externality like
contributions to a city’s overall vitality, it may again be the case that
the actor would behave no differently even if those effects were
internalized because her private payoff schedule aligns sufficiently
with the social optimum. A comedy of the commons story does not
mean that externalities are absent, but rather that they are (at least
largely) irrelevant to efficiency. 55
The fact that externalities are irrelevant to efficiency in one time
and place does not mean they will remain so forever. 56 Resources
such as urban parks that appear nonrival (plenteous) at one level of
use can become rival (congestible) above that level. 57 Likewise,
contributions to a common enterprise that flow freely under one set
of circumstances can dry up without much warning. 58 Urbanization
55. Public subsidies in the form of infrastructure or guaranteed access may have worked
very well historically in bringing participants to the point where self-interest would justify
actions with positive spillovers. See Rose, supra note 5, at 770 (discussing how public choices
about roads and waterways encouraged commerce).
56. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM . ECON. REV.
(P APERS & P ROC .) 347 (1967) (observing that changes in the value of resources can cause
property rights to emerge, where it becomes worthwhile to bear the costs of defining and
enforcing them).
57. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 57, 59 (2011) (explaining that overuse can turn an initially nonrival resource like a
park into a rivalrous one); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1991) (describing the congestion
point for goods that are plenteous up to a certain consumption level but congestible above
that level).
58. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, M ICROMOTIVES AND M ACROBEHAVIOR 91–92
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may well have turned positive interactions that were mostly selfperpetuating affairs in the past into far more economically significant,
heterogeneous, and fragile phenomena, while bringing the problems
of congestion to the forefront.
II. HETEROGENEITY IN THE COMMONS
The prototypical commons tragedy assumes homogeneity among
the players: all cattle are standard issue, delivering equal benefits to
their owners and visiting equal harms upon the commons. In an
urban context, we must contend not only with a mix of positive and
negative externalities but also with great heterogeneity among actors
in their ability to generate, magnify, absorb, and deflect these
impacts. Because participants in a commons are both producers and
consumers, the characteristics and behaviors of the participants
influence the nature of their joint product. 59 Product degradation
can occur not just through outright crowding, but also as a result of
the opportunity costs of having suboptimal contributors in place,
whether they are actually putting bads into the commons or simply
failing to contribute as much as another participant would. 60
Section A offers a stylized look at heterogeneity by considering
the significance of variation along two dimensions: capacity to
generate urban vitality or “energy” and contributions to congestion
or “clog.” Section B explains why existing market structures and
self-selection do not resolve the participant assembly problem that
urban interaction space presents. Section C notes the complications
that arise when location decisions have impacts at multiple scales
(e.g., both within and between municipalities).
A. Energy Versus Clog
Both agglomeration benefits (“energy”) and congestion costs
(1978) (describing how the dynamics of interdependent choice can unravel collective projects,
and giving the example of a “dying seminar”).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit
and Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1 (2001).
60. See, e.g., Ronit Levine-Schnur, Agreements Between Local Governments and Private
Entrepreneurs as a Means for Urban Development 43–54, 157–66 (August 2014)
(unpublished dissertation) (on file with author) (discussing differential contributions to and
draws from urban surpluses made by different actors, and examining the possibility of taking
these factors into account in bargains over development rights).
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(“clog”) rise as additional economic actors are added to an urban
area. But these benefits and costs do not rise at the same rate.
Agglomeration produces increasing returns to scale, at least within a
certain range. At some point, however, the increasing marginal costs
of congestion catch up with agglomeration benefits. If all economic
actors were equivalent and fungible, we would simply add more
actors to an area until the marginal congestion costs thereby
generated were just equal to the marginal agglomeration benefits
produced. But because economic actors are not fungible, the
particular combination of actors determines how many is too many.
The optimizing mix of actors will also vary over time due to the
availability of co-locators and the surrounding social and
economic conditions.
Introducing heterogeneity among actors along just two
dimensions reveals important aspects of the problem. Suppose there
are four types of economic actors (either firms or households) who
might locate within a given urban area, classifiable based on their
ability and propensity to contribute to agglomeration economies
(energy) and congestion costs (clog).

High Energy
Low Energy

Table 1:
Heterogeneous Actors
Low Clog
High Clog
Buzz Builders
Massive Movers
Lackluster Lites
Space-Eating Slugs

Energy, as used here, stands in for a wide range of synergies and
agglomeration economies associated with proximity. Clog represents
a constraint on the ability to use proximity to generate and consume
energy. Obvious clogs include dead space that must be traversed,
uncomfortably crowded conditions, and other hassles that must be
endured to partake of the energy within an urban space.
As shown in Table 1, the intersection of these two characteristics
gives us two extremes: desirable “buzz builders” who contribute a
great deal to the city’s energy while generating very little clog, and
“space-eating slugs” who contribute a great deal to clog and very
little to urban energy. An example of the former might be an
exciting new high tech firm that employs many creative workers but
does not demand a large physical plant, while an example of the
latter might be a large surface parking lot that is mostly
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underutilized. Table 1 also includes two intermediate cases:
“lackluster lites” who have little impact on a city’s energy or its
congestion (here, consider apartment residents who rarely leave the
building) and “massive movers” who have large impacts on both
(think big box stores, amusement parks, stadiums, and large
industrial plants). 61
Private decisions about location (as shaped by public policy and
land use regulations) can make the difference between a lively urban
area filled with buzz builders and a domain of space-eating slugs.
Increasing one’s energy quotient and reducing one’s contributions
to clog are both costly. More fundamentally, not all actors are
equally equipped to play each of the roles in Table 1. Indeed, it may
be impossible for some households or firms to reduce their clog
footprint or increase their energy quotient. But as long as the private
payoff remains attractive, such actors will continue to locate in places
that could generate more value if occupied by an actor with a
different energy-to-clog ratio.
There is a great deal that Table 1’s simplification leaves out.
Perhaps most significantly, the ability of an economic actor to
contribute to energy or to produce clog is not an immutable fact
but rather depends on what other actors and uses are nearby.
Nonetheless, even the highly stylized presentation of heterogeneity
developed here will help to illustrate why existing markets for urban
interaction space are incomplete.
B. Assembly Failures
We might initially wonder why we cannot rely on markets to
assemble urban participants optimally, just as we usually rely on
markets to channel other goods and services to their highest
valuers. 62 For now, let us assume that actors are making location
decisions independently, without any formal or informal mechanisms
for coordinating their choices. 63 If there were no interaction effects
61. Within the microcosm of a shopping mall, anchor stores would be the “massive
movers.” See Eric D. Gould et al., Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls, 87
REV. ECON. & STAT. 411, 411 (2005) (explaining that in a typical mall, anchor stores “are
responsible for attracting most of the consumer traffic to the mall” and “[o]n average, . . .
occupy over 58% of the total leasable space in the mall”).
62. The idea of a “location market” was helpfully explored in Rodriguez & Schleicher,
supra note 16.
63. Of course, a number of potential coordination mechanisms do exist, some of which
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among co-locating firms and households, these independent
decisions would work well: The person who paid the most for a
given parcel would be the one who enjoyed its attributes the most or
had the skills to derive the most profit from those attributes. Thus, a
parcel containing an isolated cabin and a grove of trees would be
purchased by the person who enjoyed viewing the trees the most,
liked the cabin’s design the most, or could most profitably turn trees
into products like fence posts and tables.
However, a primary defining attribute of any parcel is its location
relative to other land uses and land users, not just the objects or
amenities that the parcel itself contains or provides. In the urban
context, this factor takes on overwhelming significance. 64 We might
expect the benefits and detriments of proximity to co-locators to get
capitalized into the value of the property and become part of the
package that parties bid against each other to acquire. 65 Uncertainty
about the magnitude and valence of those impacts might be an issue,
but land use controls can help to stabilize expectations, 66 even if they
do so imperfectly. 67
Expected impacts do more than influence property values; they
also generate selection effects. Thus, other things equal, we might
expect urban areas to be populated by economic actors who are most
resilient to negative externalities in the area and most benefited by
positive externalities. For example, households without children who
are not as concerned about low-level criminality and who especially

will be addressed below. See id., at 658–62; infra Part III.
64. Indeed, at a broad level, the overwhelming significance of this factor is an important
explanation for urbanization itself. See, e.g., G LAESER, supra note 28, at 5 (“Agglomeration
economies are the catchall explanation for why cities can be so productive and why so many
people flock to urban areas.”).
65. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 6–7 (2001)
(discussing capitalization of local amenities and services into home prices).
66. See, e.g., LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 39–44 (2009) (discussing
land use controls as “product stabilizers”); Michelle J. White & Donald Wittman, Optimal
Spatial Location Under Pollution: Liability Rules and Zoning, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 266
(1981) (explaining how zoning “shifts the burden of forecasting future land-use patterns” and
thereby “reduces uncertainty”).
67. For one thing, such controls are subject to political change, including piecemeal
adjustments attained through ad hoc bargains. Whether the prevalence of such changes is a
feature or a bug is the subject of debate. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher,
City Replanning 20–36 (Aug. 9, 2014) (manuscript) (George Mason Univ. Law and Econ.
Research Paper Series 14-32), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477125 (discussing and
challenging favorable views of piecemeal, ad hoc bargaining over land use regulation).
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enjoy proximity to restaurants and nightclubs will be willing to
outbid households who feel the negative effects of urban life more
sharply and who are relatively less appreciative of its charms.
Likewise, firms that can benefit from knowledge spillovers or foot
traffic associated with neighboring firms will have more to gain from
locating near others, and those whose customers do not mind
crowds and difficult parking will have less to lose from congestion.
All of these preferences will be reflected in the amounts that parties
are willing to pay for the location.
Yet we cannot fully rely on markets and sorting to generate
optimal agglomerations. 68 This is so even if we set aside potential
distortions arising from land use controls. 69 The problem is this:
the party who is the high bidder for the location in question will
herself generate a stream of negative and positive externalities by
virtue of her location choice. The cash price that she pays for the
location is insensitive to what she does or does not bring to the
table in terms of negative and positive spillovers—that is, whether
her specific land use operates as a buzz builder, a space-eating slug,
or something in between. If cash prices were the sole basis for
allocating urban locations, a buzz builder who would add a large
premium in kind to the community could be outbid by a spaceeating slug for a prime spot in urban interaction space. 70
To be sure, such a distortion would not occur if the propensity
to add positive externalities to an area were tightly correlated with
one’s own valuation of that area—if, to use the terminology above,
only a buzz builder could thrive in spots where buzz building would
be valuable. In that case, being the high bidder based on one’s own
valuation would offer a good proxy for being the best contributor to
the area. Such correlations are sometimes quite plausible. For
example, it has been suggested that a high tech firm’s “absorptive
capacity”—its ability to benefit from the research and development

68. For distinct but related critiques, see id. at 34–36 (suggesting sorting is an
incomplete response to excessive land use regulation); Schleicher, supra note 4 at 1535–45
(noting tension between sorting and agglomeration).
69. Land use controls structure and limit the “location market,” and there is little
reason to expect that they do so optimally. See generally Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra
note 16.
70. Government policies, including land use controls, also play a major role in
regulating access to urban locations, as do various forms of private action. See generally id. See
infra Part III.
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(R&D) efforts of other firms—may depend on its own spilloverproducing R&D efforts. 71 Similarly, perhaps households who enjoy
crowds and excitement and therefore seek out urban residential areas
are the very same people who are best positioned to contribute ideas
and creativity to the commons. But the opposite might also be true.
For example, a wealthy middle-aged couple might wish to soak up
the hip ambience of a trendy neighborhood but might do little or
nothing to help maintain the neighborhood’s hipness against the
influx of moneyed, unhip people such as themselves. Meanwhile,
other people who would be excellent contributors in terms of ideas
and creativity may flee clogged conditions for ones more conducive
to their particular style of working.
In sum, the characteristics that cause particular economic actors
to derive the most value from a given location may or may not be
the same characteristics that would lead them to contribute the most
value to that location. Here, as in other commons situations, there is
a potential mismatch between the privately owned element (access to
a given location) and the commonly owned one (the overall urban
atmosphere). 72 The share of the commons that one’s private location
affords cannot be properly priced unless the price accounts for the
benefits or detriments that the locating party will herself be adding
or deducting in kind by virtue of locating there.
While the failure to account for the locator’s own impacts may
be the most fundamental source of market failure, other factors also
drive a wedge between the social payoffs from a given location
choice and the locator’s expected private payoffs. Instead of choosing
immobile attributes (e.g., a cabin and trees) that are confined within
a given parcel of land, an actor who chooses an urban location is
choosing a set of neighbors and prospective neighbors whose
identities and activities lie outside the chooser’s control and cannot
be reliably predicted. 73 Significantly, she recognizes that each new in71. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM . L. REV. 257, 269
(2007) (footnote omitted) (suggesting that “investments in R&D may increase a firm’s
capacity to absorb spillovers from competitors and/or other industries altogether,” providing
“an incentive to develop ‘absorptive capacity’ for inevitable spillovers by investing in R&D”);
see also Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16, at 651 (observing that only select groups are
well-positioned to capture certain kinds of spillovers and giving the example of a lobbyist who
would provide useful spillovers to another lobbyist but would be “a bore” to most others).
72. See supra Part I.B.1.
73. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 388–
402 (2013) (discussing various “informational shortfalls” about land uses and users, and some
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mover, like she herself, will not internalize all the impacts that are
generated by the location choice. In addition to directly adjacent
parcels that may literally produce cross-boundary spillovers for a
given actor, more distantly located economic actors will also
influence a given locator’s payoffs. Even if expected values can be
calculated, risk-averse actors may underbid for locations where
property values are expected to exhibit high levels of variation.
Future governmental decisions as well as future private decisions
can add uncertainty. The value of land to an economic actor depends
crucially on whether her preferred uses of the land are (or will be)
both (a) legally permitted, and (b) practically possible given the land
use rights given to others. A legal restriction could rule out a
preferred use, but so too could a conflicting nearby use that is (or
becomes) legally permissible. For example, keeping livestock might
become impermissible as a city expands (which could thwart the
expectations of ranchers) or keeping livestock might remain
permissible through a “right to farm” act (which could thwart the
expectations of those planning residential development nearby). 74
Government restrictions on land use can narrow the uncertainty
associated with the behavior of private actors, but they can also
introduce new uncertainties associated with the effects of
government action—and inaction. 75
Finally, I have assumed to this point that there is an active
“bidding” process that stands ready to move property into the hands
of higher valuers (even if those valuations are distorted in the ways
already suggested). But property rights that are physically rooted and
perpetual in duration can impede the movement of resources into
higher valued uses. Local property owners have a monopoly on their
particular parts of the urban scape—one that may become especially
significant where a shift to a larger scale of use (like a large
development project) would add value. 76 The possibility of strategic
ways they might be mitigated); Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J.
M ATHEMATICAL SOC . 143, 145 (1971) (“To choose a neighborhood is to
choose neighbors.”).
74. See, e.g., ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 547 (4th ed. 2013) (describing
right-to-farm legislation, which protects those with ongoing agricultural operations against
nuisance actions under specified circumstances).
75. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect
Property, 113 M ICH. L. REV. 345 (2014).
76. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV.
1465, 1473 (2008) (observing that land assembly situations turn existing owners into
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behavior among potential sellers in an effort to glean more surplus
from an assembly effort presents familiar holdout problems that can
impede movement of property to a more valuable use. 77
C. Multi-Jurisdictional Locational Choice
Another complication associated with heterogeneity involves the
patterns in which economic actors—households and firms—array
themselves across jurisdictions within a metropolitan area. 78 These
choices generate gains and losses for the choosers as well as for
society at large. Because of the ways in which choices combine to
generate negative and positive agglomeration effects, locational
choices within urban areas are a positive-sum game—not a zero-sum
proposition in which each gain to City A is perfectly balanced out by
a loss to Suburb B, and vice versa. This would be true even in the
absence of heterogeneity as long as adding participants to a given
subarea produces nonlinear returns. But heterogeneity makes the
problem more complicated and raises the stakes associated with
solving it; it is no longer a matter of just managing numbers across
jurisdictions, but also of optimizing along other dimensions.
I have written elsewhere about some of the dynamics and
interdependencies that characterize choices among jurisdictions
within a metropolitan area, and I will not revisit those points in
detail here. 79 But it is worth emphasizing that there are two sets of
opportunity costs associated with each locational choice. First, each
locating firm or household occupies rival interaction space that keeps
some other firm or household out of that space. Second, each
locating firm or household, by placing its locational investment here
and not there, is removing from the metropolitan pattern the
alternative locational investment that it could have made. Thus,
“monopoly suppliers”).
77. This is, of course, a primary justification for eminent domain. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
78. Households and firms make choices between metropolitan areas as well. Although I
am not focusing on those choices here, similar dynamics keep intermetropolitan choices from
being zero-sum. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Wrong Way Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/opinion/paul-krugman-wrong-waynation.html (arguing that households relocating to the south and west are doing so because of
affordable housing, not because of better opportunities, and that housing policy should enable
them to stay in the northeast and in California where their productivity would be higher).
79. See FENNELL, supra note 66; Fennell, supra note 59; Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of
Concentration, 73 U. CHI . L. REV. 1227 (2006).
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getting economic actors into the places where they can do the most
good means keeping them out places where they will block better
contributors or squander their own contributions.
The problems are too complex to untangle here, but raising the
issue of multiple jurisdictions does suggest two things. First, some
degree of mitigation may be in the picture even when location
decisions are distorted. Household A is priced out of its most socially
valuable spot in the center city, perhaps, but makes outstanding
contributions in the suburban neighborhood where it eventually
locates. Even though there is a social loss, the loss is not complete
because Household A still locates somewhere in the metro area and
is still contributing to the urban agglomeration, even at a lower level.
Second, as this example suggests, there may be interesting
distributive effects that flow from inefficient location decisions. Thus,
having high-energy households like Household A scattered among
the hinterlands could produce benefits for those who would never be
competitive to locate in the central city in an undistorted market.
This is true even if we posit that the hinterlands gain less from
Household A than the core city would. Maximizing agglomeration
benefits across a system may produce a harmful stratification that is
somewhat mitigated by the location “errors” an imperfect
system produces.
In the balance of the piece, I will focus not on the difficult
question of how best to arrange economic units within a
metropolitan area, but rather on how existing tools fail to grapple
with smaller-scale agglomeration economies—and how new tools
might do a better job.
III. PURSUING PARTICIPANT ASSEMBLY
Urban areas comprise a conjoined set: (1) a congestible resource
(interaction space) that is subject to overharvest, and (2) a strictly
complementary public good (web of agglomeration benefits) that is
subject to underinvestment. Dodging tragedies of overharvesting
and underinvestment depends crucially on the characteristics and
capacities of economic actors who are assembled together in the
interaction space, and not just on their day-to-day behaviors. 80
80. Both location choices and behavioral choices matter to externalities. Cf. Gould et
al., supra note 61, at 419 (explaining that in the shopping mall context, “[e]xternalities are
generated not only by the presence of certain stores, but also by the actions the stores take,
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Solving the commons problems playing out within cities, therefore,
requires going beyond mere crowd control or regulation to tackle
the intricate task of optimally assembling participants.
I have already suggested why market-assisted self-selection
cannot achieve optimal participant assembly on its own. 81 Section A
explains why existing land use controls are not very good at solving
participant assembly problems as they exist in urban areas. Section B
considers a range of strategies that might be able to better harness
urban energy while controlling clog.
A. Shortfalls in Traditional Land Use Controls
Scholars have recently criticized land use law for focusing almost
exclusively on negative externalities and neglecting positive
externalities. 82 This critique requires refinement. In fact, the line
between negative and positive externalities is illusory, since nearly
every impact can be characterized in either way. Pigou’s work offers
a classic example: when discussing smoke pollution, which might
seem like an obvious negative externality, 83 Pigou observed how
keeping one’s chimney from emitting smoke conferred a positive
externality. 84 And while it is indeed unusual for the law to require
those who benefit from a spillover to fork over payment for it, 85 the
law very commonly mandates actions that can be readily understood

such as advertising, maintaining cleanliness, courtesy, and product variety”). Both can be
affected by land use controls. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 66, at 123–26 (distinguishing
“compliance effects” of land use restrictions from “membership effects” that determine who
locates in the community); Michael J. Pogodzinski & Tim R. Sass, The Economic Theory of
Zoning: A Critical Review, 66 LAND ECON. 294, 295 (1990) (distinguishing “direct” effects
of land use controls from those generated by mobility). However, because location decisions
are a necessary predicate to behavioral decisions in the presence of heterogeneity, the former
are my primary focus here.
81. See supra Part II.B.
82. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 223–30.
83. See id. at 220–21 (citing Pigou in discussing significance of negative externalities in
law and economics).
84. A.C. P IGOU , THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160–61 (1920) (noting that “resources
devoted to the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys” represent “uncompensated
services” while the smoke itself “inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community”); see also
Coase, supra note 48, at 35 (discussing Pigou’s characterization of those who keep their
chimneys from smoking as “render[ing] services for which they receive no payment”); James
E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & P UB. P OL’Y 325, 325 n.3
(1992) (discussing Pigou’s view of pollution control as generating a positive externality).
85. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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as requiring parties to reciprocally confer benefits on each other. 86
Consider, for example, zoning provisions that restrict land use in
a given area to residential housing on lots of a certain size or that
require setbacks and minimum spacing between buildings. By
complying with these restrictions, each landowner contributes in
kind to a collective result. 87 Similarly, design requirements may aim
to improve the appearance of an area, or residential community
covenants may require homeowners to provide (or fund the
provision of) lawn care, fence maintenance, and the like. All of these
examples and many more could be characterized as addressing
negative externalities (the ones that would flow from building too
close to the lot line or using lower quality facade materials, for
example), but they can also readily be characterized as mandating
acts that confer positive externalities on others.
The real problem with standard land use controls relates not to
the distinction between positive and negative externalities, which is
largely a matter of framing, 88 but rather to the way that these
controls typically operate. Traditional land use controls are primarily
designed to control cross-boundary spillovers from on-parcel
activities—what I termed “sloshes” in the earlier discussion. 89 They
do so by directly addressing what can, must, and must not be done
on the owned parcel. Presumed incompatible uses are banned
wholesale in particular zones (as by separating industrial and
residential uses), and specific behaviors expected to produce
spillovers (like burning trash or keeping too many pets) are regulated
at a finer grain.
Moreover, with some exceptions to be discussed below, 90 land
use controls address spillovers by applying categorically across a
particular zone, neighborhood, or district. This works well in
keeping everyone within the area up to a particular standard, but
there is a limit to how much can realistically be demanded in terms
86. For discussion of some other ways that the law addresses positive externalities
outside of restitution, see Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 47, at 49–54.
87. See, e.g., Davy, supra note 9, at 481–83 (discussing the significance of space in front
of and between buildings); Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 68–69 (noting features of the
neighborhood commons, including “the physical environment”).
88. See generally Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 135 (2014) (examining the susceptibility of externalities to alternative frames
and exploring the determinants and significance of externality framing).
89. See supra Part I.B.3.
90. See infra Part III.B.3.
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of positive contributions from residents and businesses. Requiring
that everyone use premium building materials is one thing, but
creating a culture in which ideas flow freely across firms is another.
Still harder is ensuring that the participants attracted to particular
locations have the sorts of shareable ideas that will combine in ways
that generate value.
To return to the earlier terminology, “sloshes” are easy for land
use controls to address, but “sparks” are not. Sparks are harder to
reach because their impact and magnitude depend on the
contributions—and hence in part on the characteristics—of other
actors who are nearby in time and space. Sparks thus represent
contingent contributions to public goods or bads—the energy of a
vibrant city or the pall of a dangerous or depressed one. Because
these public goods or bads may have a “lumpy” production
function—requiring a “critical mass” to produce significant results—
relatively small differences in inputs can make large differences in
outputs, and vice versa. 91 Law enforcement efforts may attempt to
break apart bad synergies (such as gangs) to leave room for good
ones (such as play groups), but some of the more economically
important positive externalities—creating a rich intellectual climate
or a world-class music scene—cannot realistically be mandated.
It might seem that the answer lies in ever more restrictive and
fine-grained zoning classifications that would ensure landowners are
clustered together in groupings with other landowners who will
contribute to particular agglomeration benefits. Even if governments
had the necessary information to pursue such a strategy—a doubtful
proposition—there remain two problems with this approach. The
first is that the ability of a particular industry type to contribute to a
metropolitan area’s agglomeration benefits will fluctuate over time.
Focusing on just one use cuts against a diversification strategy. 92 For
91. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND M ACROBEHAVIOR, 91–110
(1978) (discussing the dynamics of a “critical mass”); Pamela Oliver et al., A Theory of the Critical
Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action, 91 AM . J.
SOC . 522 (1985) (same); Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods:
Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 P OL. STUD. 350, 353 (1982) (discussing
“lumpy” goods).
92. See, e.g., M ARSHALL, supra note 22, at IV.X.12 §3 (discussing the risks of an area
relying on a single industry and observing that this risk can be countered by developing
“several distinct industries”); Henderson, supra note 23, at 246 (noting the insurance-like
quality of diversification) (quoting E.M. HOOVER, THE LOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
288 (1948)).
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example, designating a particular area of the city for automobile sales
may ensure a critical mass of such uses and create fully reciprocal
positive spillovers among them. But if the appetite for car-shopping
wanes, those reciprocal spillovers will dwindle—and the space taken
up by the entire cluster within the downtown area will begin to exert
a negative impact (which is to say lack of a positive impact) on the
surrounding properties. 93
A second problem with relying on zoning categories or similar
sorting techniques to push together uses that emit reciprocal positive
externalities is more fundamental: it effectively requires that claims
on prime agglomeration space be paid for in kind with one’s own
similar agglomerative contributions. This tends toward a kind of
“monoculture” that not only heightens the concern raised above but
may also impede complementarities among different types of uses,
and among firms and households of different sizes or different
positions in their life cycles. 94 Although the question is an empirical
one, it seems strange to think that an efficient market would specify
that all bids for preferred locations must be made in kind by
proffering one’s own identical or similar use. 95
B. Alternative Strategies
If traditional land use controls perform poorly on the participant
assembly task that is at the heart of agglomeration benefits, what
might work better? The sections below consider some alternatives,
ranging from minor modifications of existing approaches to more
radical ways of restructuring property rights.
1. Supersizing
Could

urban

agglomerations

be

optimized

by

simply

93. Cf. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 117 (Minn.
2003) (upholding historic preservation designation for area described as the past “hub of the
automotive sales district in Minneapolis”).
94. Empirical work investigating the impact of industry diversity on urban productivity
has reached mixed results, depending on the measure of diversity employed. See, e.g., Combes
& Gobillon, supra note 17, at 274–78, 309–10, 319–21 (reviewing studies). Regardless of
exactly how industry diversity plays out citywide, however, there is reason to doubt the efficacy
of a pervasive strategy of artificially constraining variety at small urban scales. Cf. JAMES C.
SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE, 11–22 (1998) (describing failures of tree monoculture).
95. See generally Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16 (discussing how land use
restrictions affect the “location market”).
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consolidating (much) more property in the hands of a single owner?
A recent paper by Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman
suggests an affirmative answer. 96 Drawing on the model of shopping
malls, Parchomovsky and Siegelman note the potential for a single
owner to optimally manage positive spillovers among heterogeneous
tenants by charging differential rents—less for an “anchor store”
who brings in traffic, more for a small operation that benefits from
the anchor’s presence. 97 They recommend that local governments
condemn large blocks of land through eminent domain and auction
off the consolidated parcels to private parties to own and manage. 98
The proposal echoes in some respects a thought experiment that
Peter Colwell once posed, in which he suggested that zoning would
be unnecessary if parties were required to own very large tracts of
land, such as a minimum of 640 acres. 99
At the level of theory, the single-owner test is a useful heuristic. 100
By asking how a single owner would resolve a given land use
incompatibility if she owned all of the elements in the story (both the
polluting factory and the polluted-upon neighborhood, say), we can
derive the decisions that would obtain under zero-transaction-cost
conditions. 101 It is a short logical step to the idea that supersizing
ownership holdings could reduce land use conflicts and, most relevant
to the discussion here, optimize positive interactions among
complementary uses. But consolidating ownership in this way has a
number of drawbacks.
96. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6.
97. Id. at 241–45. Parchomovksy and Siegelman build on earlier work examining the
economics of shopping mall leasing practices. See, e.g., Pashigian & Gould, supra note 12.
98. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 247–57; see also Pashigian & Gould,
supra note 12, at 141 (observing that “giving developers the opportunity to develop blocks of
condemned space instead of individual parcels has much to recommend itself because
developers will take account of the externalities among stores”). Parchomovsky and Siegelman
also discuss the alternative of having the government retain ownership itself. Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 6, at 253–55.
99. Peter F. Colwell, Tender Mercies: Efficient and Equitable Land Use Change, 25 REAL
EST. ECON. 525, 529 n.6 (1997). This approach assumes there would be some rules about
what could occur near the edges of the property. See id. The purchase of large tracts of land is
of course sometimes voluntarily sought in order to internalize positive externalities. See
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 74, at 573 (recounting Disney Corporation’s decision, after its
experience with Disneyland, to assemble a tract one hundred times larger for Disney World).
100. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One
More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 556–57 (1993) (describing “the test of
the ‘single owner’”).
101. See id.
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First, although larger holdings do eliminate transaction costs in
negotiating over spillovers by simply internalizing the whole
operation, another set of problems emerges. Whether denominated
as agency costs, management costs, internal transaction costs, or
something else, the costs of internally managing the holdings of
even the most talented “single owner” are likely to prove
nontrivial. 102 In the present context, one of the costs of internal
management will be leaseholds, which themselves present moral
hazard issues and introduce new problems of misaligned
incentives. 103 This does not mean that consolidation is necessarily
the inefficient choice—we would need to know how these costs
compare to the costs of working out externalities with others, or
simply leaving them uninternalized—but it is not a magic bullet
that eliminates all sources of conflict.
Second, consolidation of property holdings can produce a variety
of social costs, from diminished competition to the loss of the local
knowledge that dispersed owners can collectively possess and
employ. 104 In addition, a large block of land owned by one party may
lack the diversity and eclecticism that arises organically from many
separately owned interests, and hence may be less generative of
positive benefits. In short, there are diseconomies of scale as well as
economies of scale, and large property holdings may at times
introduce as many problems as they solve. Whether this will be the
case may depend in part on the scale at which single ownership is
undertaken. Because agglomeration benefits are generated in a
variety of ways at a variety of scales, it is possible that consolidated
ownership
could
manage
relatively
small-scale
micro-

102. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 48, at 16; Fred S. McChesney, Coase, Demsetz, and the
Unending Externality Debate, 26 CATO J. 179, 190–91 (2006).
103. See, e.g., Derek K.Y. Chau, Michael Firth & Bin Srinidhi, Leases with Purchase
Options and Double Moral Hazard, 33 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1390, 1391 (2006) (describing
“double moral hazard” in leasehold arrangements, with misaligned incentives for both landlord
and tenant); Edward L. Glaeser, Rethinking the Federal Bias toward Homeownership, 13
CITYSCAPE: J. P OL’Y DEV. & RES., no. 2, 2011, at 5, 6 (suggesting ownership of a detached
single-family dwelling is generally best held by the resident, because she “is in the best position
to make investments”).
104. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. P A. L. REV. 2061, 2094 (2012)
(noting that “[i]f only a small number of people own property, then the property strategy loses its
advantage of tapping into dispersed local knowledge,” and pointing out other disadvantages of
concentrated ownership, including dampened incentives and fewer checks against
concentrated power).
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agglomerations 105 by locating a handful of complementary stores
together, even if it could not cost-effectively manage larger-scale
agglomerations within an urban area.
Another drawback of the supersized ownership approach relates
to the start-up costs involved. Parchomovsky and Siegelman
contemplate the use of eminent domain to acquire sufficiently large
tracts of land to be managed in this manner. 106 Eminent domain is
costly and not always politically feasible, even where it is legally
available. 107 Yet the alternative of privately assembling land may be
prohibitively costly. 108 Holdout problems that impede land assembly
might be addressed through more fundamental revisions in property
rights, as discussed below. 109 But as things stand, there are significant
practical impediments to undertaking an ownership consolidation
strategy on a broad scale.
An alternative to supersizing actual ownership would be to devise
a mechanism that would entwine the fates of neighboring economic
actors. Fleshing out the forms that this approach might take is too
large a task to take on here, but one possible model might make use
of derivative instruments keyed to the market outcomes that are
enjoyed or suffered by surrounding owners. Suppose, for example,
that a local government zoned a particular district as an “interaction
zone” and required all businesses locating within it to hold derivative
instruments indexed to the stock prices of co-locating businesses and
to the property values of nearby residences. 110 Businesses that
105. See Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 16, at 647 (distinguishing agglomeration
effects that operate at the regional level from “microagglomerations” at the scale of groups
of stores or residents).
106. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 6, at 218.
107. Consider in this connection the tremendous popular backlash that followed the
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which upheld the exercise of
eminent domain against a public use challenge.
108. This is an empirical question. For one take on the issue, see Daniel B. Kelly, The
“Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and
Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 18–24 (2006) (suggesting private assembly may
often be possible, given the ability of private parties to assemble land secretly using
buying agents).
109. See infra Part III.B.5.
110. A great number of operational details and safeguards would have to be hammered
out, from determining appropriate stakes, to preventing parties from hedging the risk
associated with the required stakes, to ensuring that the approach did not produce or
perpetuate discriminatory behavior or patterns. The idea of requiring stakes as a way of
aligning incentives is not wholly unprecedented. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Executives and
Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM . L. REV. 440
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expected to have net positive impacts on their neighbors would have
an extra incentive to locate in such a zone, while those who would
derive benefits from others without contributing positively to the
area would effectively pay a premium for locating there. The result
might be an assembly pattern that is closer to what a single owner
would produce, without the associated drawbacks of
consolidated ownership.
2. Paying for buzz
Where it is possible to identify a particular economic actor who
produces asymmetric benefits for neighbors, a different strategy is
possible—that of directly charging nearby parties for the benefits that
they receive. In general, the law does not require payments from
those who receive gratuitous benefits from others, apart from a few
narrow categories of restitution. 111 Ariel Porat argues for an
Expanded Duty of Restitution (EDR) that would require payments
from those who receive unrequested benefits in a broader set of
circumstances. 112 If such payments were mandatory, the argument
runs, then more activities that produce positive externalities would
be encouraged.
Whatever merits such an idea might have in cases where a single
actor engages in a discrete act that produces plainly valuable benefits
for identifiable others, it is unlikely to offer much traction in
addressing urban agglomerations. 113 Perhaps the most promising
urban application would be where a unique economic entity such as
an entertainment venue nonreciprocally generates benefits for the
(2000) (discussing potential of stock options in executive compensation to produce incentive
compatibility where hedging is absent); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang, The
Green Option, 99 M INN. L. REV. 967 (2015) (proposing a model in which large companies
might be required to take a stake in “green” enterprises); Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin,
Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI . L. REV. 143, 174–75 (2010) (describing a model in
which neighboring jurisdictions would share risk by buying instruments indexed to each
other’s property values).
111. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
112. Porat, supra note 46, at 205–14.
113. Porat places a number of limits on the domain of his proposed EDR so that it would
not apply in, inter alia, categories of cases where the risk of overvaluation or costs of
enforcement are unduly high. See, id. at 226. Presumably these conditions would rule out the
use of the EDR to sort out complex urban agglomeration benefits, although Porat does discuss
applying EDR in instances in which the acts of one party increase the property value of
another. See e.g., id. at 191 (providing an example in which a property owner will not construct
a park that would also benefit his neighbors unless the neighbors cover some of the costs).
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surrounding community that, for practical reasons, cannot be
internalized. But courts have shown themselves unwilling to provide
such venues with recourse against even those near neighbors who
purposefully capture spillovers for commercial gain. In an 1886 case,
for example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the Detroit BaseBall Club’s claim for injunctive relief against a neighbor who erected
viewing stands that allowed his customers to observe games without
paying admission. 114 A similar scenario was presented in an Australian
case, Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co. v. Taylor. 115
There, the High Court rejected the idea of “property in a spectacle”
and declined to enjoin radio broadcasts carried out from premises
overlooking an open-air horse racing facility. 116
The law is understandably reluctant to allow an enterprise that
has failed to contain its own spillovers to restrict what nearby
landowners can do with those spillovers. Line-drawing and
measurement problems abound. Urban areas contain elaborate webs
of interdependencies that confound causal inferences about who
benefited (or harmed) whom. 117 Rarely will there be just one
“anchor tenant” who provides vast nonreciprocal benefits in roughly
equal measure to all surrounding owners. Instead, there will likely be
a series of unique uses that not only emit different levels of positive
and negative externalities but are also enjoyed by nearby landowners
at varying levels and are reciprocated in varying and greatly unequal
degrees by those surrounding owners. A more intricate system of
payments for positive and negative externalities could be imagined,
although finding a workable way to administer it would be highly
challenging. 118 At some point, however, the opportunity costs of
114. Detroit Base-Ball Club v. Deppert, 27 N.W. 856, 858 (Mich. 1886); see also
ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 74, at 572–73 (noting the general inability of landowners to
recover for positive externalities they create).
115. (1937) 58 CLR 479 (Austl.); see Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 252, passim (1991) (examining connections between property theory and the analysis in
Victoria Park Racing).
116. See Victoria Park Racing, 58 CLR at 492–97 (Latham, C.J.); see also Gray, supra
note 115, at 268.
117. In Detroit Base-Ball Club, for example, the defendant contended that the
neighboring ball field had also interfered with the quiet use of his land. 27 N.W. at 857.
118. See T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization
of Spatial Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 341 (1990) (“An ideal system would not only
match the external benefit or cost [of a landowner’s activities] with a subsidy or tax, but would
also collect money to finance the subsidies, and distribute the proceeds of the taxes collected,
according to the impacts of the externalities.”).
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foregone agglomerations may be large enough to justify the
considerable costs of attempting to pin down and compensate for
certain asymmetric impacts. 119
3. Differential pricing
Another way local governments could address agglomeration
costs and benefits would be by applying differential pricing to land
uses and land users. Differential pricing is a common mechanism
where participant assembly is important. Consider, for example, its
use in higher education to bring together a desired mix of students—
some students are charged full freight while others receive various
amounts in scholarships, stipends, and other assistance that allows
them to attend at reduced or even negative prices. 120
Land use authorities already have access to what amounts to
differential pricing to the extent that they are free to strike
individualized bargains with landowners about land uses. 121 Their
ability to do so is arguably impeded, however, by the doctrinal limits
on bargaining laid out in Nollan and Dolan, and recently (and quite
confusingly) reinforced and extended in Koontz. 122 The selective
119. See Demsetz, supra note 56.
120. See, e.g., Rothschild & White, supra note 14.
121. These deals generally fall under the rubric of land use exactions or impact fees. See,
e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478–83 (1991). Such devices might be viewed
as charging for the negative impacts that the use will inflict on the surrounding community or
as collecting for the positive benefits that existing infrastructure will provide. See id. at 482–83.
122. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), required an
“essential nexus” between the exaction and the rationale for the land use restriction that was
lifted in exchange for it. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), added the requirement
of “rough proportionality” between the impacts that the land use restriction would control and
the exaction. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013),
held that these limits apply to monetary exactions as well as physical ones, and that the
prohibition extends to bargaining efforts that do not actually result in any money or land
changing hands. It is unclear to what extent these limits have actually blocked desired deals, as
opposed to simply channeling them (at some positive cost) to repeat players or through
particular procedural hoops. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of
Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1286–99 (1997) (positing that exactions
restrictions will benefit repeat players who can be trusted not to sue); FISCHEL, supra note 65,
at 67 (suggesting developers will choose to pay—or “donate”—rather than litigate). The
expanded domain of heightened scrutiny ushered in by Koontz may also matter less in practice
than anticipated, depending on the remedies that are applied (an issue the Supreme Court did
not decide). See Rick Hills, Koontz’s Unintelligible Takings Rule: Can Remedial Equivocation
Save the Court from a Doctrinal Quagmire? P RAWFSBLAWG (June 25, 2013, 3:41 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/koontzs-unintelligible-takings-rule-
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determination of development “prices” based on each landowner’s
contributions to agglomeration benefits may be especially hard to
square with doctrine. 123 Perhaps the growing significance of
agglomeration economies to economic value will eventually create
pressure to relax the doctrine, however, permitting more valueenhancing trades. 124 Other ways of effectively altering prices include
using eminent domain to allow certain projects to go forward and
offering tax breaks to particular parties. 125
Sometimes differential pricing occurs not explicitly by setting a
variety of monetary prices for different participants, but implicitly
by setting in-kind conditions that are cheaper or more expensive for
certain categories of participants to fulfill. Consider in this
connection the requirements under the Homestead Act, which
made living on and working the land for a period of time a
condition of perfecting title. 126 Similarly, concert ticket pricing
typically combines a below-market-clearing price with an in-kind
charge—standing in a queue. If those who are willing to stand in a
queue are, on average, better audience members than those who
are simply willing to pay a higher price, the two-part pricing will
work better at participant assembly than a market-clearing price. 127
can-remedial-equivocation-make-up-for-an-incoherent-substantive-.html.
123. Koontz left open precisely how the monetary exactions subject to heightened
scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan would be distinguished from ordinary taxes and fees. One
possibility would be to apply heightened scrutiny only to adjudicative types of exactions
imposed on a case-by-case basis, and not to legislatively imposed exactions. See Koontz, 133 S.
Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting this possible distinction, which some state courts
have embraced). Even if this refinement were adopted, however, it would not help to facilitate
the kind of price discrimination contemplated in the text, unless good proxies for contributions
to agglomeration could be built into a legislatively enacted schedule of fees. For related
discussions see, for example, Hills & Schleicher, supra note 67 at 53–59; Levine-Schnur, supra
note 60, at 160–62 (discussing factors that might be evaluated in an “urban impact
assessment” to determine contributions and suggesting ways in which discretion might
be calibrated).
124. On the other hand, there may be substantial uncertainty about the degree to which
differential pricing carried out by a local governmental entity would produce the social
optimum, given potential information and incentive problems.
125. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Reframing Eminent Domain: Unsupported Advocacy,
Ambiguous Economics, and the Case for a New Public Use Test, 32 VT. L. REV. 129 (2007)
(explaining how eminent domain lowers land assembly costs for developers, and noting other
methods, such as subsidies, for similarly reducing the cost of development).
126. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM . L. REV. 931, 960–61 (1985) (discussing self-selection in the context of the
Homestead Acts).
127. See, e.g., Lutz-Alexander Busch & Philip A. Curry, Ticket Pricing and the Impression
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Similar approaches might be attempted in urban contexts. For
example, certain neighborhoods by virtue of their “edginess” may
screen out some populations while attracting others. Although this
often happens in an unplanned manner, governments can
intentionally embed uses and amenities that will produce selfselection effects or allow developers to do so. 128 To take a small-scale
example, simply removing parking facilities from a beach area will
have an impact on the number and type of beachgoers, and the
activities that they undertake. 129 Requiring that beachgoers make it

of Excess Demand, 111 ECON. LETTERS 40 (2011) (presenting a two-part pricing model for
event tickets in which fans of higher quality have a lower cost of lining up, allowing the line-up
to perform a quality-screening function); Allan C. DeSerpa, To Err Is Rational: A Theory of
Excess Demand for Tickets, 15 M ANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 511, 515–17 (1994)
(presenting a concert pricing model in which “the highest-demand buyers in terms of money
price will generally not be the ‘best audience’ in their own estimation”).
128. See G ARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M. M URPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS: M ARKET
BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 72 (2000) (noting the possibility that governments
use amenity choice to shape demographics); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in
Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006) (discussing the use of “exclusionary
amenities” in private residential communities). Some of the strategies Richard Florida
proposed for attracting and retaining the “creative class” would fall in this category as well. See
generally RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS (2002). Florida’s thesis has
been the subject of significant criticism. See, e.g., Michele Hoyman & Christopher Faricy, It
Takes a Village: A Test of the Creative Class, Social Capital, and Human Capital Theories, 44
URB. AFF. REV. 311, 329 (2009) (finding no relationship between the presence of a creative
class and “job growth, growth in wages, or absolute levels of wages” and finding a negative
correlation between measures of the creative class and other economic measures); Jamie Peck,
Struggling with the Creative Class, 29 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RESEARCH 740 (2005)
(discussing and critiquing Florida’s thesis). As these critiques suggest, the ability of
communities to successfully pursue agglomeration benefits through strategies aimed at
selection effects would depend on their having good empirical information about the impacts
of those strategies.
129. Scarce parking would weed out visitors who prefer to drive and might reduce the
spontaneous formation of crowds. Likewise, increasing the proportion of people who arrive by
bicycle or mass transit and who therefore cannot conveniently carry tents, grills, and other
bulky items, may change the activities and average length of time spent at the beach. These
issues have come to the forefront in a recent debate over reducing parking at a popular
Chicago beach, a move considered following a large illegal concert held there. See John
Keilman, Architect’s Montrose Beach Plan Would Sacrifice Parking, CHI . TRIB., July 23, 2014,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-montrose-beach-improvementplan-20140723-story.html. The intentional manipulation of amenities to exclude populations
from public beaches has at times taken reprehensible forms. See ROBERT A. CARO , THE P OWER
BROKER: ROBERT M OSES AND THE FALL OF NEW Y ORK 318–19 (1974) (describing Robert
Moses’s efforts to exclude low-income and African-American families from Jones Beach by,
among other things, limiting public transportation to the beach and charging high parking
fees); see also LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 193–95 (2011)
(discussing Moses’s exclusionary tactics).
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to the beach by walking or biking imposes an in-kind tax that
automatically filters the population; it might produce a beach full of
people who are more fit, on average, than if the beach is made
accessible by private automobile. But such requirements might also
produce an underutilized beach under some plausible assumptions.
If the goal is not just to prevent overcrowding but to produce
optimal usage of an area and to make it a locus of interesting
interactions, then too few users (of the right sort) is as bad as too
many. 130 Whatever filters are put in place to control access must not
be so stringent as to stymie production of the shared experience, nor
so loose as to degrade its quality. It is also essential to ensure that
such approaches do not become back-door mechanisms for
discrimination along forbidden dimensions. 131 Giving close attention
to in-kind pricing can both open up new possibilities and reveal the
ways in which such strategies are already (perhaps unwittingly) being
employed. Awareness of these approaches is especially important
given normative concerns about certain incarnations of them.
4. Revising zoning
Traditional Euclidian zoning, the type in use in nearly all
communities above a certain size, operates by specifying uses that are
permitted in particular zones and banning all others. 132 This
approach does not deal well with the challenges of agglomeration.
But other forms of zoning might carry more promise in this regard.
Performance zoning focuses not on uses but rather on their impacts,
such as certain decibel readings or pollutant concentrations detected

130. See, e.g., M ICHAEL HELLER, THE G RIDLOCK ECONOMY 32–37 (2008) (discussing
the problem of underuse in connection with the anticommons); Rose, supra note 5 at 769
(noting the need to encourage certain forms of participation).
131. See, e.g., BECKER & M URPHY, supra note 128, at 72; STRAHILEVITZ, supra note
129; Strahilevitz, supra note 128.
132. The zoning scheme upheld in City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), was cumulative in nature: each successive zoning category allowed increasingly
intensive uses, but continued to permit the less intensive uses that were allowed in the more
exclusive zoning categories. Modern zoning is often noncumulative, generating mutually
exclusive realms for different uses. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., P ROPERTY 979 (8th ed.
2014) (distinguishing cumulative from noncumulative zoning). The choice between
cumulative and noncumulative zoning could carry significant implications for agglomeration
economies. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using
Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI . L. REV. 249,
262–67 (2010).
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outside the owned parcel. 133 While usually considered in the context
of negative externalities like noise or emissions, performance zoning
would be interesting to consider in the context of
positive externalities.
Suppose, for example, that cameras or other technologies could
determine the number of trips on foot to a given store from outside
of a fixed radius of, say, a couple blocks. In a “high foot traffic”
zone, new uses might be permitted only if they can guarantee (say,
by posting a bond) that they will draw a certain amount of foot
traffic into the area on average, over a particular span of time. In
areas where only a few stores are likely to serve as “magnets” that
draw in foot traffic, designating entire zones might not be desirable;
instead, special exceptions for larger or denser uses might be granted
to those willing and able to meet this output target.
As another example, suppose that knowledge spillovers comprise
the primary desired agglomeration benefits. Here, zoning might
specify that uses in the area have a certain minimum average number
of employees on site each workday, thereby discouraging companies
from adopting liberal work-from-home policies. More intrusively,
targets could even be set for such matters as employees consuming
meals in the immediate area, perhaps through a subsidy program. 134
Such performance standards would be easier to meet for firms whose
business model involves on-site employees. Although it would not
necessarily attract the companies that would contain the highest
quality community contributors, such an approach would at least
ensure that some of the ingredients for interaction—workers—
are present.
Similarly, some communities have attempted to use covenants or

133. See, e.g., JANE JACOBS, DARK AGE AHEAD, 153–57 (2004) (discussing a
“performance code” focused on impacts); DOUGLAS R. P ORTER ET AL., FLEXIBLE ZONING:
HOW IT WORKS 11 (1988) (explaining how performance zoning in pure form specifies
permissible effects rather than uses); Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (1991) (discussing rationales for and types of performance zoning).
Performance zoning has not been widely used to date, which can likely be attributed to
monitoring difficulties. It is possible that technological advances could be harnessed to make
the use of performance zoning more viable. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land
Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 391–96 (2013).
134. Subsidized meals are a very common way to encourage interaction. See, e.g.,
Prospective Students, Academic Culture, U. CHI . L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago
.edu/prospective/academicculture (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (“Learning through lunch is a
tradition at Chicago.”).
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zoning to restrict residential occupancy to those who will be present
on a relatively long-term basis. 135 Presumably, such restrictions are
motivated by views about the positive and negative spillovers
produced by properties that are mostly left vacant or that experience
high turnover as compared with those that are continuously
occupied by the same parties.
Drawing on the discussion above, zoning might also seek to
more directly address energy/clog ratios, perhaps through scoring
systems that examine factors like traffic impacts, foot traffic, the
commuting and parking patterns of the workers, and so on, in
conjunction with the space requirements of the use. Particular uses
that are thought to be especially important to the city’s life can also
be directly encouraged, as some communities have done in setting
aside housing for artists. 136 Transect zoning represents a somewhat
similar idea: it focuses on the types of buildings that will appear in
different areas of a city, letting land use follow form rather than the
other way around. 137 But building forms are at best a rough proxy
for the kinds of considerations that are most important to
agglomeration economies and diseconomies; a better approach
would be to focus directly on the considerations themselves—if local
governments can determine what they are.
5. Rethinking everlasting, rooted estates
A final set of ideas, which I am developing further in separate
work, strikes at the heart of existing property forms. The
assumption that property rights must be granted in physically
rooted locations and be perpetual in length should be rethought in

135. See, e.g., Natalie Sherman, Weekly Rentals in Ocean City May Be Outlawed, BALT.
SUN, Aug. 16, 2014, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-0816/business/bs-bz-ocean-city-rentals-20140816_1_short-term-rentals-weekly-rentalsplanning-and-zoning-commission; TOWN OF NANTUCKET, M ASS. ZONING CODE § 1392(A)(5) (2009), http://ecode360.com/11471475 (requiring that occupancy of accessory
apartments “be limited to natural persons domiciled in the Town of Nantucket year round
and that the dwelling may not be offered for nor used for seasonal occupancy”).
136. See, e.g., ArtistSpace Housing, BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
http://www.bostonredevelopmentauthority.org/housing/artist-housing/artistspace-housingoverview (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
137. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571,
575–76 (2013) (explaining that “transect zoning permits a wide variety of land uses
throughout a community, so long as these uses are carried out in buildings that are appropriate
in size and design to the zone where they are located”) (footnote omitted).
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light of the sea change that has transpired over recent centuries in
how property generates value. Building optional forms of
impermanence and portability into tenure forms could offer
important new avenues for restructuring property rights.
Consider first the possibility of a less permanent estate that would
(unlike a leasehold) embody the other features of full ownership, but
that would be expressly “callable” by the government after a certain
period of time. 138 Already, governments hold call options insofar as
eminent domain can truncate rights of private landowners. Creating
estates that are impermanent by design and enabling local
governments to designate areas in which these callable estates will be
located would provide a great deal more flexibility. It would also
enable parties to sort into more or less permanent property rights
arrangements, depending on their preferences. By making
redevelopment easier in certain areas, such an approach would be
expected to reduce resort to eminent domain in other areas.
A second idea would loosen the usual assumption that real
property interests must be tied to a particular physical location.
Suppose, for example, that parties in urban areas could purchase
“floating estates” of a particular value, with particular attributes, on
the understanding that their property interest might be physically
moved to a different location within a defined zone at some later
time,with relocation costs covered.
As unusual as this may sound, there are antecedents. Land
readjustment, although not well-known in the United States, has
been used in other countries to accomplish something very similar to
this idea. 139 Instead of simply condemning private property through
138. Such a property interest could take the form of a fee simple subject to executory
limitation. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., P ROPERTY 290–92 (8th ed. 2014) (defining and
describing these estates). The trigger conditions for the executory interest might be tied to
certain economic or social indicators that suggest the appropriateness of redevelopment, to the
passage of a certain amount of time, or both. Such an approach could work entirely within
existing tenure forms, consistent with the numerus clausus principle. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 Y ALE L.J. 1, 26 (2000).
139. See, e.g., Yu-Hung Hong, Assembling Land for Urban Development: Issues and
Opportunities, in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND COLLECTIVE
ACTION 3, 23–24 (Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie Needham eds., 2007) (describing reallocation
methods). Although approaches vary considerably, the basic idea can be illustrated by
imagining a low-density residential neighborhood that would be more valuable if it were
replaced with a higher-density mixed-use development. The area might be razed and
redeveloped with higher-density residences, shops, and green space. Each former resident
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eminent domain, land readjustment displaces parties from their
original locations but grants them equally valuable land parcels in the
redeveloped area or shares in the enterprises that their displacement
made possible. Acceptance for this approach might be higher if,
instead of simply placing all landowners at risk of such a land swap,
parties could choose to purchase land that would be subject to such
an arrangement in the future. Again, the goal would be to increase
both security and flexibility by enabling people to opt into
arrangements that diverge from the traditional rooted, perpetual
fee simple.
CONCLUSION
Agglomeration economies are already central to how property
generates value and will become even more important going
forward. Urbanization has fundamentally changed the way in which
property is used, and has dramatically increased the degree of
interdependence among land users and land uses. It is important that
commons scholars begin unpacking the nature of the dilemmas that
this global trend has created and start finding ways to adapt existing
property tools—or invent new ones—to address these new
challenges. I hope this essay offers a step in that direction.

might then receive a smaller residential site in the new development, but because of the effects
of the new development, it would be of equal or greater value than the property she was
initially required to give up. For more background on this approach and its many variations,
see generally ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT, supra; George W. Liebmann, Land
Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 URB. LAW. 1 (2000).
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